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Abstract
Two major pieces of employment discrimination legislation were passed in the early 1990s: the
1991 Civil Rights Act and Americans with Disabilities Act. Using some simple regression
models, we examine the effects of this legislation on the volume, content and outcomes of
employment discrimination cases filed in federal courts. We find, first, that the volume of
discrimination cases nearly doubled between 1992 and 1997, in contrast to a 10 percent decline
during the previous 8 years, and despite a sharply falling unemployment rate that–in the
past–would have substantially reduced the amount of litigation. We also observe a significant
shift in the composition of suits filed, with race and age discrimination cases declining
substantially as a share of the total and sex and disability discrimination cases increasing. We tie
these developments, as well as changes in the relationship between plaintiff win rates and the
business cycle, to changes in the law that diminish the importance of back-pay damages. We
conclude by tentatively suggesting how the meaning of and protection afforded by employment
discrimination law has changed over the past 35 years.
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At least in the national discourse, these seem to be relatively quiet times for employment
discrimination law. While specialists in the field recognize that there are always cutting-edge
developments in particular areas–the law governing disabled workers is one current example–the
field as a whole is not subject to the same kind of extended national scrutiny and debate as it was
when Congress was considering the 1990 and 1991 Civil Rights Acts, or during the Clarence
Thomas hearings.
Despite this lack of attention, however, we suggest that employment discrimination law has
undergone some dramatic yet largely unrecognized changes since the start of the last decade,
changes that are substantial enough to amount to a revolution, albeit a quiet one. For one thing,
the number of employment discrimination suits filed in federal district courts doubled between
1992 and 1997. (Litigation volume reached a peak of more than 20,000 suits per year in 1995,
and then fell by some 21 percent by 1997.) During the previous 8 years, by contrast, the volume
of litigation had actually declined by some 10 percent.
 Moreover, the explosive rise in the volume of litigation during the 1990s occurred against a
backdrop of unparalleled economic prosperity and falling unemployment rates. This is significant
because–as we demonstrated in a series of articles in the early 1990s–there has traditionally been
a strong negative relationship between the volume of employment discrimination suits and
prosperity the labor market (Donohue & Siegelman, 1991; Siegelman & Donohue, 1991;
Donohue & Siegelman,  1993; Siegelman & Donohue, 1995). Indeed, as we show below, what
was once a robust relationship between the volume of employment discrimination litigation and
the unemployment rate has completely broken down during the last 10 years. This suggests that
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more than a mere quantitative change has occurred: we don’t just have a lot more suits being
filed than 10 years ago, we seem to have an entirely different relationship between the volume of
litigation and the rest of the economy.
Figure 1 provides compelling graphical evidence of this structural change. In the top half, it
plots the number of employment discrimination suits filed in federal district courts during each
calendar quarter from 1969 through 1997 (the circles), along with the predicted number of suits
based on a simple model that utilizes only the lagged unemployment rate and a time trend as
explanatory variables (the solid line). As can be seen, the model fits the actual data remarkably
well during the period before the third quarter of 1991. At that point, however, the model appears
to break down completely: while the sample regression model (estimated prior to 1992) would
have predicted that the volume of litigation should have declined modestly as the unemployment
rate fell (see bottom panel, which plots the de-trended unemployment rate), the actual number of
suits skyrocketed over the next 5 years–more than doubling during this period despite a steady
downward trend in the unemployment rate.
In addition to changes in the number of suits filed, it would be helpful to identify changes in
the composition of litigation since 1991. Unfortunately, the case-filing data do not allow a direct
identification of the type (race, sex) or basis (hiring, firing, harassment) being alleged.
Information on charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC can be used as a rough supplement
to the data on filed cases, however, and these data reveal a pattern that is roughly consistent with
the importance of the 1991 Civil Rights Act as a source of the increased caseload.
Together, these structural changes cry out for an explanation.  It would indeed be surprising
if the underlying acts of discrimination rose 2.5-fold between 1992 and 1996.  Has something
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about the evolution of the law during this period made it more attractive for plaintiffs to bring
certain kinds of suits that they would formerly not have chosen to file? Has it been the expansion
of possible causes of action that has generated the increased caseload? Or perhaps an extra-legal
story involving increased mobilization of potential plaintiffs lies behind the rise in litigation. In
addition, the kinds of structural changes we document below raise significant questions about
who employment discrimination law actually protects, from what kinds of discrimination, and
how well.
In the rest of this paper, we attempt a preliminary assessment of the state of employment
discrimination law in the 1990s, focusing not on the evolution of doctrine, but on the evolution
of the law “in action”–on how people now use the law that is available to them. Section I begins
by briefly sketching in the rules of employment discrimination law before 1990, stressing in
particular the rules for calculating damages in discrimination suits. Our earlier work
demonstrated that damages have traditionally played a vital role not only in determining the
number of suits filed, but also the rate at which suits go to trial and the rate of plaintiff victories.
Congress substantially changed the rules for calculating damages during the early 1990s, at least
for some classes of suits, and a new basis for liability–disability discrimination–was added to the
body of employment discrimination law. After describing these changes, we go on to evaluate
their effects in Section II. We look at three different kinds of evidence: changes in the
composition of the federal employment discrimination caseload after 1992; changes in the
relationship between the business cycle (unemployment rate) and the volume and outcomes of
employment discrimination litigation; and changes in the size distribution of awards to prevailing
plaintiffs. Almost all of this evidence is consistent with our argument about the importance of the
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1991 Civil Rights Act and the ADA, but there are qualifications and uncertainties that are
unresolvable with the existing data. In the final section, we offer some speculations about the
future of employment discrimination law.
II. Structural Changes in the 1990s
A. The Importance of Back Pay Before 1991
In a series of papers written in the late 1980s, we developed what then appeared to be a
coherent economic account of the forces driving several aspects of employment discrimination
litigation. This section briefly summarizes the theoretical and empirical insights that emerged
from these papers as they applied to the world of employment discrimination litigation before the
passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act.
Briefly put, the key to understanding a plaintiff’s behavior in deciding whether or not to
bring an employment discrimination claim in the first place–and, once the claim is filed whether
or not to settle–is the way that damages are calculated. 
Before 1992, damages in employment discrimination suits were largely limited to back pay.
The basic pre-Civil Rights Act of 1991 rule was that “Title VII provides only equitable remedies;
damages other than back pay are not recoverable.” (Cox, 1987, p. 5-17; DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 
Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ, Pearson v. W. Elec. Co.) Reinstatement, promotion,
and changes in employment practices have also been available as remedies, but our data suggest
that plaintiffs ask for and secure them through settlement or judgment far less frequently than
they receive monetary settlements or awards (Donohue & Siegelman, 1991). 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) offers a limited version of punitive
damages: conditional on a proof of willful violation of the statute, double recovery of actual
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damages is available. (Cox, 1987, p. 23-14; Fortino v. Quasar Co.). Punitive and compensatory
damages as such, however, were not available under the ADEA (Cox, 1987, p. 23-16). Suits
under the Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Act, §1981, do allow for punitive damages in addition
to back pay, but cover only discrimination on the basis of race. 
Consider someone who lost her job because of a discriminatory firing, and was then
unemployed for twelve weeks. Assume that she was initially making $500 per week, and that her
new job pays the same salary as her old one. Her back pay damages simply are the difference
between what she would have earned but for discrimination (12 weeks at $500/week = $6,000)
and her actual earnings (in this case, zero) for the period during which she was unemployed.
Hence, she will be entitled to $6,000 in back pay.1
Several important facts about employment discrimination litigation followed from this
observation. First, back pay awards under the pre-1991 Civil Rights Act were usually small, and
were positively related to a plaintiff’s wage. A prevailing plaintiff who had been earning $5 per
hour could expect to receive only $10,000 in back pay damages if discrimination caused her to be
unemployed for a year after losing her job (as a result of discrimination). Even a very highly-paid
employee could not expect to earn much more than $150,000 under similar circumstances.  
Second, as our examples just indicated, the size of her back pay award depends on the
length of time that the plaintiff was unemployed. Since the duration of unemployment spells
tends to be longer in recessions–when the unemployment rate is high–and shorter during periods
of economic prosperity, it follows that average awards were more generous in slumps than during
booms. This in turn suggests that plaintiffs should have been more willing to bring employment
discrimination cases during recessions:  the rewards for doing so were larger than when the
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economy was robust, while the costs were presumably the same. 
Furthermore, if plaintiffs brought cases during recessions that they would not otherwise
have brought, these recession-induced cases should have had a lower probability of plaintiff
victory than those brought during booms. Suppose the risk-neutral plaintiff knows she will
receive a back pay award of $10,000 if she prevails. Given costs of $1,000, she will only bring
suit if the probability of victory is greater than 10%. But if the award size increases to $20,000,
the plaintiff only requires a probability of victory of 0.05. By raising damages conditional on
victory, a recession induces some low-probability plaintiffs–who would not otherwise have found
it worthwhile to file suit–to come forward and do so. Hence, the average win rate should fall
during recessions, as the mix of cases shifts to include those with lower win rates. 
Our back pay-driven model yielded at least three empirically testable predictions: 
(1) the size of awards to prevailing plaintiffs should be larger for cases filed when
the unemployment rate is high than for those filed when it is low; 
(2) the number of suits filed should rise during recessions and fall when the
unemployment rate is low; and 
(3) the plaintiff win rate in tried cases should fall during recessions and rise when
the economy is prosperous. 
Using data obtained from the Administrative Office of the US Courts (AO) and supplemented by
our own data collection, we were able to confirm all three of these predictions, and to reject
various other alternative explanations for our findings, as summarized in Table 2.
B. Changes in the Early 1990s
1. The 1991 Civil Rights Act
Spurred in part by a number of Supreme Court decisions restricting the scope of federal
employment discrimination law, and by complaints of inequitable treatment of sex discrimination
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claims, Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act.2 The legislation modified many aspects of
federal employment discrimination law, but the most important aspects are summarized in Table
3 and discussed briefly here. 
The most significant changes wrought by the 1991 Civil Rights Act were designed to
provide greater equity for sex and other non-race discrimination plaintiffs, who were considered
to be at a disadvantage because they were not able to utilize § 1981. Thus, for so-called
“ineligible cases,” the 1991 Civil Rights Act expanded the realm of potential damages beyond
back pay to include compensatory damages (e.g., for psychological distress, therapy expenses,
medical bills) and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination (limited, however, by
the size of the defendant firm).3 This had the effect of turning disparate treatment employment
discrimination cases into suits at law, rather than equitable actions (Back pay had been
considered an equitable, rather than a legal, remedy.) As a result, the 7th Amendment’s right to a
jury trial in civil cases meant that Congress was forced to confer the right to jury trials at the
same time it expanded damages. “Forced” may be the wrong verb, since the right to a jury trial
was generally viewed with enthusiasm by plaintiff advocacy and Civil Rights groups, as we
discuss below.4
Together, these changes meant that non-race discrimination plaintiffs were eligible for
substantially higher awards than previously. Moreover, what was once the only monetary
remedy–back pay–became just one part of a much larger array of potential damages that non-race
discrimination plaintiffs were allowed to collect for the first time. Since there is unlikely to be a
strong link between the size of non-back pay awards (e.g., for emotional distress) and the
business cycle, we might expect to see that the volume and win rate in employment
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discrimination cases would be less sensitive to the state of the economy after the 1991 Act.
2. The Americans With Disabilities Act
The 1991 Civil Rights Act (CRA) was not the only important piece of employment
discrimination passed by Congress in the early 1990s. Passed a year earlier than the CRA, the
Americans with Disabilities Act's employment provisions became effective six months after the
1991 CRA went into effect. A far-ranging piece of legislation, the ADA extended beyond
employment to testing, architectural design, and many other areas of life. We focus on the
employment provisions in Title I, whose effective date for firms with 25 or more employees was
July 26, 1992. Those with 15-25 employees were given an additional 2 years before the Act was
extended to cover them. 
The ADA created two distinct causes of action for covered employees: first, it gave workers
the right to be free of discrimination because of their disability, just as Title VII gave them the
right to be free of discrimination because of their race or sex.  Remedies were essentially the
same as those under the post-1991 CRA Title VII.5
In addition, however, the ADA created an affirmative duty for employers to make
“reasonable accommodations” to the needs of “qualified” employees with disabilities, defined as
someone who has the “requisite skill, experience and education requirements of the employment
position, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform essential functions
of such position.” §101(8). Hence, under the ADA, qualified disabled employees can require
employers to make buildings more accessible (e.g., installing ramps instead of stairs), to modify
work schedules (e.g., allowing part-time work), to install special equipment (e.g., specialized
computer screens with larger type), to grant them more time to complete examinations or other
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performance evaluations, and so on.5
In sum, both the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act gave plaintiffs' expanded opportunities
to seek remedies beyond back pay. For plaintiffs with disabilities, the reasonable
accommodations requirement meant that they could for the first time force their employers to
alter working conditions in a way that would allow them to keep their jobs. The 1991 Civil
Rights Act granted some plaintiffs the right to compensatory and punitive damages that were
previously unavailable to them.  
Cutting in the other direction, we note that the Supreme Court held in 1992 that payments
received in settlement of a backpay claim under Title VII were not excludable from the
recipient’s gross income under §104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows for
exclusion of “damages received on account of personal injuries.” (United States v. Burke). This
of course reduced the after-tax amount of Title VII damages, at least in those circuits that did not
already follow this rule. It thus cuts in the opposite direction from the other changes discussed
above that increased the size of expected awards to plaintiffs. 
The net consequences of these developments are spelled out more fully, and tested against
the existing evidence, below.
C. Data and Sample Partition Issues
Below we present data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO), which
records all “Employment Civil Rights” cases filed in Federal district courts. The AO began
tracking employment discrimination cases filed after January, 1969. Our previous dataset ended
in June, 1989, but the data now extend through September, 1997. (We constructed a quarterly
time series by simply counting the number of cases filed in each 3-month period starting on Jan
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1, 1969. Outcome variables–how a case was decided–only became available for cases closing
after 1978, and of course are not available for cases that were still pending as of September,
1997. There is reason to believe that such cases might differ systematically from those that had
already closed. For example, most cases filed in 1995 had closed by 1998; those that had not
might be unusually complex, unusually large, or otherwise atypical.  In order to dampen the
effect of this duration dependence, we eliminated all cases filed after 1996:3, one year before the
data ended, in our analysis of win rates.)   
In what follows, we use the number of “Federal Question” employment discrimination suits
filed per calendar quarter as the measure of the employment discrimination caseload. (This
measure excludes all suits in which the Federal government is either the plaintiff or the
defendant. We omitted Federal-plaintiff suits because of a concern that government-litigated
cases are likely to be different from garden-variety employment discrimination suits. Presumably
the former have larger stakes, involve more complicated legal and factual issues and more time-
consuming preparation, and focus on different subjects. We omitted cases in which the Federal
government was a defendant because our previous research revealed that many of these are due
process cases, with different procedures and remedies from those available to Title VII, ADA or
§ 1981 plaintiffs.) Since the dataset and its limitations have already been described at
considerable length in our previous papers, we do not repeat that material here.
Our method for assessing the effects of the civil rights legislation of the early 1990s on the
volume of suits filed or other aspects of litigation is quite simple. If these laws did have a
significant effect on the volume of litigation (or its relationship to the business cycle or to the
passage of time), we would expect to see a break or turning point in the time series at roughly the
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time that the legislation went into effect. Our strategy, then, is to divide the period from 1969 and
1997 into two parts–one before and one after the new laws went into effect–and look for
differences. 
Since the laws did not go into effect at the same time, however, we have to decide the
appropriate point at which to partition the sample. The effective date of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act was November 21, 1991. The ADA went into effect in two phases: firms with 25 or more
employees were covered as of July 26, 1992, while those with 15-24 employees were covered as
of July 26, 1994. The second round added about 9 percent of the labor force which was employed
at firms with 15-24 employees to the covered population (STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES (1997), Tables 621, 844 and 847) . We chose January 1, 1992, largely for
convenience. This is the earliest possible reasonable date to divide the sample, and hence
maximizes the number of observations in the second part of the sample, which is still
substantially shorter than the first. It turns out that the results that follow are not sensitive to the
choice of a later partition date, as Figure 1 suggests graphically.
III. Predicting the Effects of the New Laws: What Should We Look For & How Should we
Look?
This section presents several different pieces of evidence on the effects of the early 1990s
legislation. We examine a proxy for changes in the composition of the federal employment
discrimination caseload after 1992, changes in the relationship between unemployment rates and
the volume and outcomes of litigation, and changes in the size distribution of awards to
prevailing plaintiffs. Almost all of this evidence is consistent with our argument about the
importance of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the ADA, but there are qualifications and
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uncertainties that are unresolvable with the existing data.
A. Caseload Composition: A Shift in Favor of “New” Areas of Law
The simplest test for the effects of the new legislation would be to look at the growth in
litigation by the type of discrimination alleged. For example, if much of the increase in litigation
came from Age Discrimination cases, whose rules were not altered by the new laws, it would be
difficult to attribute the observed growth to the statutes. By contrast, if we saw tremendous
growth in claims alleging disability or sex discrimination, we would have a stronger case that the
legislation of the early 1990's was responsible. Indeed, since disability discrimination claims
were essentially not cognizable before 1992, any increase in disability claims must be due to the
ADA, at least as a “but-for” cause.
Unfortunately, however, the AO data do not permit one to disaggregate “Employment Civil
Rights” cases by the type of discrimination (age, sex, disability, race, etc.) being alleged. Hence,
no direct test along these lines is possible. Instead, we have to rely on charges of discrimination
filed with the EEOC. Except for cases raising only a § 1981 or Equal Pay Act claim, all
employment discrimination cases that wind up in federal district court must first have been
processed through the EEOC.7 Unlike the Administrative Office of the US Courts, the EEOC
does keep track of the type of discrimination alleged by the charging party, and these data thus
provide a window on the composition of filed cases, even though historically only 10 percent of
EEOC charges have gone on to generate a federal district court filing. (These data are naturally
subject to sample selection problems, since the process by which a charge becomes a filed case is
assuredly not random; hence, the picture derived from aggregate charge data at the EEOC may
not accurately reflect the selected subset of claims that then go on to become filed cases in
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federal district courts. Although our earlier work did not find any evidence of such selection, the
ability to test for these problems is limited.) 
Table 4 examines charges of discrimination with the EEOC for a number of different
categories of employment discrimination claims.  While we have noted that the overall caseload
has risen despite the steadily dropping unemployment rate of the 1990s, Table 4 reveals that race
and age discrimination charges filed with the EEOC actually experienced a decline in over the
period from 1991 to 1996. Since the legislation offered little or no encouragement to these kinds
of claims, these results are more in keeping with our earlier work which would have suggested
that the booming economy would lead to a decline in the absolute numbers of cases. Conversely,
sex discrimination charges grew by 31.2 percent, again consistent with the positive incentives
created by the 1991 CRA.  Finally, disability discrimination charges, which became legally
cognizable for the first time in the 1990s, grew from a small number to 18,000 in 1996–a figure
higher than the number of age discrimination cases and about 75 percent of the number of sex
discrimination cases.
In conclusion, the large growth in federal district court filings of employment discrimination
cases is substantially higher than the growth in discrimination complaints filed with the EEOC. 
Race and age discrimination charges filed with the EEOC were declining modestly in the early
1990s, while sex discrimination and disability charges with the EEOC were growing briskly.
Still, the increase in the total number of federal court cases and federal court trials was far greater
than the increase in the EEOC filings.  The desire to get before a jury for the first time and to
collect compensatory and punitive damages might explain the greater federal litigation
concerning sex discrimination complaints since these options only became available with the
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CRA of 1991.  But this option was always available in race cases (because of section 1981) and
age cases.
B. Weakened Business Cycle Sensitivity
1. The Volume of Litigation
As suggested earlier, both the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act reduced the importance
of back pay damages, albeit in different ways. The CRA expanded monetary remedies for a class
of cases (predominantly allegations of sex discrimination) that had previously been eligible to
collect only back pay damages. After 1991, sex discrimination plaintiffs could get punitive and
compensatory damages, and could take their cases to a jury, rather than a generally less-
sympathetic judge. The ADA's “reasonable accommodations” requirement meant that disabled
plaintiffs could force employers to change the organization of the workplace to make it more
conducive to their continued employment. This, too, reduced the importance of backpay damages
in a plaintiff’s assessment of the remedies available under employment discrimination laws.
By increasing the possible benefits available to plaintiffs, both statutes should increase the
volume of litigation, at least in the short run, simply because some plaintiffs who would not have
found it desirable to sue under the old rules would look at the enhanced damages under the new
regime and conclude that litigation was worthwhile. Of course, the ADA also created a whole
new cause of action that was not cognizable before its passage, and this alone should lead to an
expansion of litigation.
Moreover, both statutes should attenuate the relationship between the business cycle and the
volume and outcomes of employment discrimination litigation. As back pay becomes less
important in the total package of damages available to plaintiffs, the link between plaintiffs’
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decisions and the unemployment rate should grow correspondingly weaker. When back pay was
all a plaintiff could get, business cycle-induced changes in the amount of back pay should have
mattered much more than they do under today's rules.8 In short, we would expect both statutes to
generate more litigation and to diminish the importance of business cycle effects on the number
of suits filed.
 Tables 5 and 6 test these predictions by presenting some summary statistics and regression
results for a simple model in which the volume of suits filed in quarter t depends on the number
of quarters that have elapsed since Jan. 1, 1969 (as well as its square), and the unemployment
rate in quarters t-1 and t-2. This was our standard model developed for the 1969-1989 data, and
as evidenced by Figure 1, it fit the data for that period extremely well. 
Table 6 takes a somewhat different approach from Figure 1. Rather than using the pre-1991
model to forecast the volume of suits in the post-1991 period, we estimated a different equation
for each period, and then compare them. There are some telling differences in the relationships
for the two periods. Most importantly, while there is strong evidence of a business cycle effect
before 1992, the effect seems to vanish after that date.
Before 1992, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment generated about 145
additional employment discrimination suits two quarters later. Both the one- and two-quarter
lagged values of the unemployment rate coefficient were positive and statistically significant
during the first part of the sample. By contrast, there is no discernible relationship between
unemployment and the volume of litigation during the period after 1991. During this period, a
one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate was associated with 30 fewer suits per
quarter (two quarters later). Moreover, the net measurement obscures the fact that one of the
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estimated unemployment coefficients is positive while the other is negative, and neither is
statistically significant in the post-1991 data. In other words, there is essentially no business
cycle relationship apparent for the period after 1991. 
Although a simple visual inspection of the table reveals the different business cycle
relationships across the two periods, there are also several formal ways to test whether the
unemployment (and other) coefficients in the pre- and post-1992 periods are statistically
significantly different from each other. All of these tests demonstrate conclusively that the
relationship between unemployment rates and the volume of suits filed are indeed different
across the two periods.
Unfortunately, however, there is a technical problem with interpreting these results as
evidence in support of our story about the effects of the legislative interventions in the early
1990s. Because unemployment followed an almost steady downward path between 1991 and
1997, the regression has a hard time accurately assigning responsibility for the rising number of
suits during this period to either the time trend or the unemployment rate–the two factors are
statistically almost indistinguishable, a classic multicollinearity problem.9 Put another way, the
observed increase in the correlation between unemployment rates and the Time Trend for the
post-1992 data will by itself tend to produce large standard errors and statistically insignificant
unemployment coefficient estimates for this period. This is precisely the same result we would
predict on the basis of our story about the legislative interventions of the early 1990s. If business
cycle effects on the volume of suits necessarily appear weaker after 1992, regardless of whether
they actually are, it is hard to use this evidence in support of our explanation about the effects of
the CRA and ADA. 
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2. Litigation Outcomes–Settlement and Win Rates Over the Business Cycle
a. Why Should The Business Cycle Influence the Win Rate?
The back pay mechanism linking the volume of litigation with the business cycle is simple:
assuming that the costs of litigation are relatively invariant, an increase in plaintiffs’ damages
makes them more likely to pursue litigation, and higher unemployment rates cause longer
durations of unemployment and larger awards to prevailing plaintiffs. The link between
unemployment rates and the outcomes of litigation follows almost directly from this observation. 
When plaintiffs expect to receive higher damages if they win, they are willing to bring cases that
have a lower probability of winning. For example, suppose a lawsuit costs $2,000 to bring, and
the plaintiff will recover $20,000 in damages if she prevails. Then if she is risk-neutral, she will
want to bring any suit whose chance of success is greater than 10 percent, since any such suit will
have a positive net expected value. Now suppose that because of a recession, the plaintiff’s
damages if she prevails rise from $20,000 to $30,000. The plaintiff now requires only a 6.66
percent chance of success in order to make filing suit economically worthwhile. The additional
cases brought forth by a rise in the unemployment rate should therefore have lower plaintiff win
rates, and the average win rate for all cases filed during recessions should thus be lower than for
cases filed when the unemployment rate is low. This link between the business cycle and the
plaintiff win rate is not merely hypothetical. In earlier work, we demonstrated that, at least for the
period before 1989, an increase in the unemployment rate did in fact call-forth cases with lower
plaintiff win rates (Siegelman & Donohue (1995).) As summarized in Table 1, we found that an
increase in unemployment from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above its
mean generated a fall in the plaintiff win rate of about 1 percent (0.6 percentage points). The
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marginal cases brought forth by the increase in the unemployment rate had a win rate that was
about 21 percent (4.5 percentage points) lower than the average for the baseline cases.
The connection between the business cycle and the adjudication rate–the rate at which filed
cases go to trial rather than settling–is somewhat more complex and less intuitive.10 Again,
however, our earlier work demonstrated that in the period before 1989, the rate at which filed
cases settle rather than going to trial did indeed increase during recessions, exactly as predicted
by at least some models of settlement and litigation.
In sum, there is strong evidence that the business cycle influenced the outcomes of
employment discrimination for cases filed before 1989. As we discussed earlier, the legislation of
the early 1990s diluted the importance of back pay, and we would therefore predict that the effect
of business cycles on litigation outcomes should be weaker after 1992 than it was before.
b. Empirical Evidence
Table 7 provides some evidence on what happened to the business cycle effects on
outcomes of employment discrimination in the 1990s. In the period before 1992, a 1 percentage
point increase in the unemployment rate raised the settlement rate by about 4 percent and lowered
the plaintiff win rate by about one-tenth that amount, with both magnitudes statistically
significant. After 1991, however, the business cycle relationships essentially vanish. Neither the
win rate nor the settlement rate appear to be influenced by the unemployment rate at all: both
coefficients change sign (a recession now appears to raise the plaintiff win rate!), but neither
effect is statistically significant at even modest levels.
This evidence is entirely consistent with our theory. Unfortunately, however, the same
problems discussed earlier with respect to the volume of litigation are present here as well. The
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sharply lower variance in detrended unemployment rates during the post-1992 period means that
the regression has lower power to detect any business cycle effects that do exist. Moreover, the
shortened sample after 1992 exacerbates these problems. Hence, we might expect to see weaker
business cycle effects regardless of the effect of the early 1990s legislation, merely as a result of
reduced statistical precision in the estimates.
C. Award Sizes
The Administrative Office data contain a measure of the amount of damages awarded to
prevailing plaintiffs, so some of our predictions about the effects of the early 1990s legislation on
award sizes can be tested directly.11
Our analysis of the early 1990s legislation leads us to predict that smaller awards should fall
as a proportion of the total, while larger awards should increase. The logic here is simple.
Smaller awards are mostly back pay. But the import of both the CRA and the ADA is that more
plaintiffs are eligible for awards beyond back pay, so we would expect the fraction of all awards
that are ‘small’ to be declining. Larger awards will tend to include punitive and compensatory
damages, and their share of all awards should increase under the new laws.
One might argue that the number of small award cases should fall absolutely, not just as a
proportion of the total. After all, the economy has been increasingly healthy in the post-1992
period, and the declining unemployment rate should generate smaller back pay awards to
prevailing plaintiffs. However, there are two reasons to be cautious here. First, despite the steady
improvement in unemployment since 1992, the average post-1992 unemployment rate was only
0.5 percentage points lower than the average for the previous period. Moreover, non-random
settlement may mean that smaller-award cases are not equally likely to settle.
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Table 8 presents several aspects of the award size distribution that allow us to test our
predictions against the available data. As predicted, small awards (for example, those under
$25,000 in constant dollars) fall as a proportion of all awards during the post-1992 period.
Awards under $25,000 comprised almost half (48.2%) of all awards to prevailing plaintiffs
before 1992, while these small awards were only 39.9% of all awards in the subsequent period.
The table also reveals that overall, more prevailing plaintiffs were getting larger awards: the
larger the top award size, the more rapid the growth rate in average award size (in the last
column). For example, the average award among those plaintiffs receiving less than $25,000
grew by only 2.2 percent in real terms, while the average award for those plaintiffs receiving less
than $500,000 rose by more than 38 percent. (Awards between $1 million and $9.998 million are
more likely to be multiple-plaintiff cases. Since we have no way of controlling for the number of
plaintiffs in any given case, or to track changes in the number of plaintiffs per case over time, it
is safest to focus on awards of less than $1 million.) And although it was still surprisingly small,
the median award among awards less than $1 million also rose substantially after 1992: half of
all awards before 1992 were smaller than $20,800, while the post-‘92 median was $32,700, an
increase of more than 57 percent.
D. California Filings
In many states, employment discrimination plaintiffs have a choice of filing a claim in state
court under a state anti-discrimination statute or in federal court under Title VII. For some time,
California employment discrimination law has offered plaintiffs expanded remedies (beyond
backpay), coverage for disability discrimination, and the right to a jury trial. Even after the
passage of the 1991 CRA, plaintiffs in California could have litigated the same causes of action
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and obtained the same or better damages and remedies by suing under state law.12 Hence, if the
1991 CRA were driving the growth in litigation, we might expect to see little or no increase in
federal district court filings in California, since the legislation provided California plaintiffs with
nothing more than they could have already obtained in state court.  
Figure 2 plots the growth of federal district court filings in California and in the rest of the
country. Contrary to our predictions, federal district court filings in California track those in the
rest of the country very closely, even though the 1991 CRA did not provide any additional
advantages for California plaintiffs.  This may suggest that the allure of federal court is
substantial for California plaintiffs even though on many dimensions, state employment
discrimination law is more favorable than federal law.
IV. What Does It All Mean?
So there are a lot more suits than there used to be, awards to prevailing plaintiffs are up, at
least in the larger size categories, and the business cycle no longer seems to have much of an
effect on any aspect of employment discrimination litigation. So what? Are these more than just
a set of technical findings or economist’s curiosa? Here, we attempt some partial and tentative
answers.
Like any other social phenomenon, Title VII was a product of its time. It was largely
designed to address a particular problem–the inability of African-Americans to break into many
jobs in many regions of the country because many employers simply refused to hire (or even to
consider) them. That Title VII also addressed discrimination in firing and promotion, as well as
discrimination on the basis of national origin, religion and (especially) sex is largely a result of
political maneuvering and luck. The legislative history of the employment provisions of the 1964
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Civil Rights Act makes it very clear that, in the minds of both its supporters and opponents, the
chief “problem” against which it was directed was exclusion on the basis of race at the hiring
stage. Other types of discrimination (e.g., on the basis of sex) were either not taken seriously or,
in the case of firing, were not a serious problem because there were essentially no blacks in jobs
other than at the lowest echelons of the employment structure.
 While the evidence we present in this paper is limited in scope, it seems almost axiomatic
that the civil rights legislation of the 1990s is a product of its time–our time–no less than its
predecessor was. In this section, we succumb to the temptation to go beyond what the evidence
clearly demonstrates and speculate about the meaning of employment discrimination law at the
start of the new millennium. What, then, might our new employment discrimination law(s) say
about us? 
A. The Decline of Back Pay, and the Increasing Role of Juries in Deciding Cases and
Setting Damages
In fashioning remedies for victims of employment discrimination, the drafters of Title VII
faced a serious concern. The 7th Amendment gives either party the right to a jury trial in a civil
case. Civil rights supporters were thus worried that defendants would elect a jury and–given the
substantial opposition to civil rights (especially among Southern whites) and the under-
representation of blacks on jury panels–would be able to escape any liability for their
discriminatory behavior. The compromise that was reached was to limit damages to backpay:
since this was considered equitable rather than legal relief, the 7th Amendment wouldn’t come
into play, preventing defendants from requesting a jury trial. Greater certainty of punishment was
explicitly traded-off against lower monetary awards.
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The text of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, and the behavior of the employment discrimination
caseload in the 1990s, suggest that the problem of racist white juries refusing to sanction
discriminatory employers no longer seems to be a serious concern. In fact, it is often employment
discrimination plaintiffs who want a jury trial today, and Civil Rights groups such as the NAACP
were strong supporters of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Admittedly, many of the reasons had
nothing to do with jury trials. It seems clear, however, that if the NAACP thought plaintiffs
would be seriously disadvantaged by jury trials, they would have made this an issue.  All this
suggests that the anti-discrimination principle is more widely accepted than it used to be (a
proposition for which there is abundant evidence from other sources), and that even Civil Rights
groups recognize this fact.
B. The Decline of “Pure” Wage Discrimination and the Rise of New Damages
Thirty-five years ago, the paradigmatic case of employment discrimination was an
employer’s outright refusal to hire someone because of his or her race. Title VII recognized a
simple remedy for this problem–the victim of discrimination was entitled to receive backpay
damages equal to the difference between what she would have earned in the job she did not get,
less the amount she actually earned (or could reasonably have earned) over the relevant time
period. In a world where many firms–perhaps a majority–discriminated, a worker who was
turned down by one firm would often have found it difficult to land an alternative job, since other
employers were engaging in the same discriminatory practices as the firm that rejected her in the
first instance. 
Other things equal, therefore, the more pervasive is discrimination, the larger backpay
damages will be, since victims of discrimination will have a more difficult time mitigating
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damages on their own via the market when discrimination is widespread. Conversely, as the
share of discriminators among all employers declines, the monetary cost to those job applicants
who do experience discrimination should fall: when an applicant who is rejected by firm 1
because of her race can walk across the street to firm 2 and be hired immediately, firm 1's
behavior imposes essentially no monetary cost on the applicant.
In Gary Becker’s (1956) animus-based theory of discrimination, the amount of economic
discrimination (measured as the wage difference between equally productive black and white
workers) is set by the tastes of the least discriminatory employer. If there are any employers who
do not have a discriminatory premium, there will be zero economic discrimination in the long
run, since in equilibrium, all black workers will be able to work for these employers with no
wage penalty at all. Becker’s model predicts perfect segregation, but no loss in wages to black
workers, and since it assumes away any dignitary harms to blacks, all the costs of discrimination
are borne by the discriminators in equilibrium.
Becker’s key conclusion–that in the long run discrimination is costless–rests on a crucial
assumption that there are no dignitary or psychological harms (or search costs) borne by its
victims. Rather than assuming them away, it seems more plausible to imagine that such costs will
likely be felt  even in a segregated Beckerian equilibrium, when a victim of discrimination
suffers no loss in earnings. Consider the case of discrimination by taxicab drivers, for example.
A recent study in Washington DC study revealed that blacks had to wait about 5.7 minutes to get
a taxi to stop for them, while it took whites 4.5 minutes. (The study is unpublished, but the
results are presented and critiqued in Siegelman (1999).) If we make the mistake of treating this
as a purely monetary harm, we might value the 72 seconds of lost time at $12.50 per hour,
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roughly the average wage. In that case, the monetary “cost” is a modest $0.25. But the
psychological harms are quite likely to be substantially greater than this. The problem is not that
certain persons can’t get a cab at all, or have to wait for hours to get one. Rather, the harms seem
to be much more connected to the loss of dignity that occurs when one is passed-over by a cab
driver solely because of one’s race.13
As the distinguished sociologist Orlando Patterson (1997) suggests, dignitary harms can
increase–even as the amount of racism falls and the rate of integration rises–for 2 reasons. First,
as blacks encounter whites more frequently, their possible exposure to discriminatory behavior
will rise, even as the proportion of interactions that are discriminatory goes down. Second,
members of traditionally disadvantaged groups now have an expectation of better treatment than
they would have had 40 years ago. When these higher expectations are not met, persons affected
by discrimination may experience psychological costs that would not have been felt at a time
when discrimination was simply “the way things were.”
Returning to the employment context, if–as seems reasonable–the costs of discrimination 
are increasingly lost utility and dignitary harms, rather than lost income or earnings (Neal &
Johnson (1998), we might need to start to thinking differently about what employment
discrimination law should and actually does protect. Instead of compensating persons for lost
earnings, we might want to broaden the scope of legally cognizable harms to include damages
that are not recognized under the simple backpay model of Title VII. A modest movement in this
direction already seems to be under way.
C. The Declining Relative Significance of Race Discrimination?
Race discrimination claims have apparently fallen–at least as a share of EEOC
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complaints–and now constitute a plurality of such claims by a small and shrinking margin. Many
other kinds of discrimination now compete for the attention of the media, for the sympathies of
the voter, and for the government’s scarce enforcement budget. 
What should we make of this? On the one hand, it is a tribute to the power of the traditional
civil rights model that it has been so widely adopted by other groups (women, the disabled, gays
and lesbians, the elderly). It is difficult to be against civil rights for everyone. But the widespread
adoption of civil rights rhetoric and civil rights remedies could come at a serious cost if it causes
us to lose sight of the uniquely perfidious history of discrimination against African-Americans.
Figure 1
A Time Line of Significant Dates
Quarter: 82 86 92 95 103 111 115
Date: 1989:2 90:2 91:4 92:3 94:3 96:3 97:3
Prev. Data 1991 Civ. ADA1 ADA2 Win Rate Filing
Ends Rts Act Effective Effective Data End Data End
Effective
Note: Title I of the ADA, covering employment, became effective for firms with 25 or more employees as of July 26, 1992. Coverage was extended to firms with 15 or more employees as
of July 26, 1994. 
Table 1: Effects of an Increase in the Unemployment Rate on Volume 







At Unemployment Rate  = 6.04% 1367 61.3% 20.9%
For the Additional Cases Generated by    
Rise in Unemployment Rate to 8.66% 
   (2 Std. Dev. Increase)
515 84.6% 16.4%
At Unemployment Rate = 8.66% 1882 67.7% 20.3%
      Percent Change +37.7 +10.4 -0.97
Source: Siegelman & Donohue (1995).
Table 2: Backpay Damages as the Link to the Business Cycle. 
A Summary of Previous Findings
Damages 1 percentage-point 8in unemployment rate –> 8 damages to
prevailing pltfs by $2,000 - $3,000. Flanagan (1987) found
identical effects using better-quality data on back pay
damages under NLRA.
Volume of Suits Counter-cyclical (8 during recessions). Each 1% 8 in
unemployment rate 8 number of suits filed by about 150 per
quarter after lag of 3-6 months. Plaintiffs bring more suits
when damages are higher.
Plaintiff Win Rate Increases for cases filed during booms, falls during recessions
Plaintiffs willing to bring lower-probability suits when
awards, conditional on winning, are higher. 
Settlement Rate Increases for cases filed in slumps, falls during booms.
Weaker cases brought during slumps tend disproportionately
to settle, as predicted by, e.g., the Priest/Klein (1984) model.
Composition of Suits Did not change over the business cycle, either by basis of
discrimination (race, sex, etc.) or by type of discrimination
(hiring, firing, etc.)
Suits Against US Gov' t Increased during recessions (counter-cyclical), as did suits
against pvt. defendants. But US gov't doesn’t lay people off in
recessions, so we are not observing a layoff effect
Lags Lag between changes in unemployment and suit filing too
short to be explained by layoffs. It takes at least 6 months to
get through the EEOC, so if upturn in unemployment rate
causes increase in filings with a lag of, e.g., 3 months, it can
not be true that the effect is due to increased number of
firings.
Discrimination May rise during recessions, but suggests plaintiff win rates
should also increase at such times, rather than falling.
Table 3: Summary of Changes Under 1991 Civil Rights Act
1. For Title VII cases not eligible under §
1981 (incl. sex discrimination complaints,
esp. harassment, & retaliation), added non-
back pay damages:
Allowed compensatory damages (e.g., for      
emotional distress)
Allowed punitive damages (capped by firm size)
Also allowed jury trials
2. Overturned Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)
§ 1981 does cover post-contract formation
discrim., incl. firing
3. Misc. Other Provisions Extended Title VII to Congressional employees;
Overturned Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 
   490 U.S. 642 (1989) (tightened standard for      
  business necessity in disparate impact cases);
Overturned Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490     
   U.S. 228 (1989) (allowed damages in some    
“mixed-motives cases”);
Overturned Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490  
  U.S. 900 (1989) (lengthened filing period for     
  challenges to discriminatory seniority systems);
Allowed for recovery of expert witness fees by    
    prevailing plaintiffs;
Overturned Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S 755             
  (1989) (expanded possibilities for challenging   
    civil rights consent decrees)
Table 4: Numbers of Charges Filed w/EEOC, By Type of Discrimination,









Race Claims 29,548 26,287 28,819 -11.0 -2.5
  % of Total 40.9 33.7 37.2
Age Claims 19,573 15,719 14,141 -19.7 -27.8
  % of Total 27.1 20.2 18.3
Sex Claims 21,796 23,813 23,907 9.3 9.7
  % of Total 30.1 30.6 30.9
Retaliation Claims
   All Statutes 11,096 16,080 19,694 44.9 77.5
      % of Total 15.3 20.6 25.4
   Title VII 10,499 14,412 17,883 37.3 70.3
      % of Total 14.5 18.5 23.1
Disability Claims 1,048 18,046 17,007 1621.9 1522.8
  % of Total 1.4 23.2 22.0
Other Claims 10,116 9,220 9,963 -8.9 -1.5
  % of Total 14.0 11.8 12.9
Total Charges 72,302 77,900 77,444 7.7 7.1
Total Claimsb 103,676 123,577 131,414 19.2 26.8
Claims/Charge 1.43 1.58 1.70 10.5 18.9
Note: aSince charges can claim more than one type of discrimination (e.g., race and sex), Total Charges is the
number of filed charges, not the  total number of claims of discrimination. 
bTotal Claims is the actual column sum.
Table 5: Summary Statistics for Partitioned Sample
(Before and After Effective Date of 1991 Civil Rights Act)
1969:1 - 1991:4 1992:1 - 1997:3
Variable Mean
Std.
Dev. Min, Max Mean
Std.
Dev. Min, Max
Number of Suits 1182 647 0, 2270 3644 909 2054, 5186
Time 46 27 0, 92 104 6.8 93, 115
Detrended
Unempl. Rate, -1a 0.0 1.12 -2.0, 3.6 0.0 0.4 -1.0, 0.8
Detrended  
Unempl. Rate, -2a 0.0 1.11 -2.0, 3.6 0.0 0.5 -0.8, 0.9
N 92 22
Note: aDetrended Unemployment Rate is the residual from a regression of the lagged unemployment rate on Time
and Time2 with correction for AR(1) errors. Separate regressions were used for the two sample halves. The
number following the minus means a lag of one or two quarters–that is, the unemployment rate in the
quarter previous to the one in which the number of suits filed is being measured.
Table 6: Regression of Number of Employment Discrimination Suits
per Quarter on Time and Detrended Unemployment Rates,a
1st and 2nd Halves of Sample
1969:1 - 1991:4 1992:1 - 1997:3
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Coeff. T-Stat.
Timeb 46.56 9.76 269.1 5.34
Time2 -0.27 -5.43 -6.96 -3.16
Detrended Unempl.
Rate, -1c 94.85 5.75 173.21 1.08
Detrended Unempl.
Rate, -2c 49.63 3.01 -203.88 -1.33
Constant -180.18 -1.90 1833.35 7.63
Summary Statistics
Adjusted R2 0.77 0.76
Durbin-Watson 1.90 1.97
D^ 0.70 0.24
N  92  22
Notes: aRegressions estimated using Prais-Winston correction for AR(1) errors. 
bTime and Time2 are reset to zero for the 2nd period regression.
cDetrended Unemployment Rate is the residual from a regression of the lagged unemployment rate on
 Time and Time2. Separate detrending regressions were used for the two sample halves.
Table 7: Effect of a One Percentage-Point Increase in the Detrended
Unemployment Rate, Before and After 1992:a
Effect On: 1977:2-1991:4 1992:1 - 1996:3
Settlement Rateb +3.9% -5.4%
Win Ratec -0.36% +1.8%
N 58 18
NOTES:
aAll estimates based on grouped logistic regressions w/separate
time trends for each period. See note c of previous table.
bBoth pre-1992  estimates statistically significant at 5 percent.
cNeither post-1992 estimates statistically significant at 10 percent.
Table 8: Average Real Awards in $1000s, by Award Sizea 
(for Cases Filed Before and After Effective Date of 1991 Civil Rights Act)
All Awards Less Than:
58 Quarters from 1977:2-
1991:4













$25,000 2,507 8.9 48.2% 756 9.1 39.9% 2.2
$50,000 3,216 14.9 61.9% 1,020 15.9 53.9% 6.7
$100,000 3,773 23.1 72.6% 1,276 26.7 67.4% 15.6
$200,000 4,162 34.1 80.1% 1,494 43.7 78.9% 28.2
$500,000 4,420 50.3 85.1% 1,665 69.6 87.9% 38.4
$9.999 Millionb 5,153 528.6 99.2% 1,894 594 100.0% 12.4
All Awards (incl. 9999) 5,196 615.1 100.0% 1,894 594 100.0% -3.4
Median for Awards
Less Than $1 Million 4,602 20.8 1,713 32.7 57.2
N Rate N Rate % Change in Rate
Total Plaintiff Wins 7,095 20.5% 2,206 13.1% -36.2%
Adjudicated Cases 34,562 30.6% 16,886 23.7% -22.6%
Total Cases 112,845 71,213c —
Cases/Quarter 1946 3956 103
  Unemployment Rate 58 6.9% 18 6.4% -7.2
aAwards are not on a per plaintiff basis.
b“9999” may have been used to indicate missing values or “not-applicable.”
cIncludes 6,458 open cases not included in award size tabulations above.
Figure 2
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ENDNOTES
1. This is the simplest possible case, a stylized example designed to illustrate the basic
forces at work. Further wrinkles include: what happens when the plaintiff takes a new job at a
wage lower than her previous one; whether unemployment compensation is deductible from back
pay awards (courts were divided on this issue during the period before 1991); whether awards are
subject to federal income tax (again a circuit split, plus changes in the tax code); how to calculate
the period over which back pay accumulates (see Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, holding that a
rejected offer of (re)employment from the original employer, without retroactive seniority, is
sufficient to toll the accumulation of back pay), and so on.  
2. Ward's Cove Packing v. Atonio (broadening business necessity defense in disparate
impact claims), Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (restricting coverage of post-contractual
discrimination under § 1981), Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (restricting plaintiff’s recovery in
‘mixed-motive’ disparate treatment cases), Martin v. Wilks (requiring joinder of adversely
affected “outsiders” such as white employees in civil rights actions), Lorance v. ATT
Technologies (requiring challenges to seniority system be filed within statutory 300-day period
starting from the adoption of the seniority rules, not from when the rules had an effect on
plaintiffs).
Since the mid-1970s, most race discrimination plaintiffs have had a choice of federal
statutes under which they could challenge discriminatory practices. Such practices are forbidden
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but most are also prohibited under § 1981 of the
1866 Civil Rights Act, which bars discrimination on the basis of race (but not sex) in the
“making and enforcement of contracts.” (The Supreme Court held that the statute covered
employment contracts in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency.) Section 1981 offers plaintiffs
several important advantages over Title VII: fewer procedural hurdles (no requirement of a right
to sue letter from the EEOC, looser statutes of limitations), the right to a jury trial, and expansive
remedies beyond backpay (including compensatory and punitive damages). It does not, however,
cover sex discrimination, nor does it recognize cases of race discrimination based on disparate
impact theories. 
The 1991 Civil Rights Act, which modified all these areas of law, became effective when
it was signed by President Bush, on November 21, 1991.
3. “Ineligible” refers to those Title VII plaintiffs who could not also bring a §1981 claim of
racial discrimination. See §102 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1981a (2002). These
include plaintiffs claiming intentional discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, or national
origin, by far the majority of which comprise sex discrimination claims. See Table 3.
4. Many of the other provisions in the 1991 Civil Rights Act were largely symbolic or of
minimal importance to the overall volume and composition of the employment discrimination
caseload. These include extending Title VII protection to Congressional employees, changing the
interpretation of the statute of limitations for challenges to intentionally discriminatory seniority
systems, and changing the definition of “business necessity” in disparate impact cases. Because
of the preponderance of firing cases in the federal employment discrimination caseload, § 101 of
the Act (overturning the Supreme Court's holding in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union that §
1981's antidiscrimination prohibition did not cover “post-contract formation” discrimination such
as discrimination in firing) might be of greater importance than the other provisions discussed
above.
5. The question of exactly what constitutes a disability under the ADA is complex and still
subject to significant uncertainty. The statute speaks of persons with an “impairment” that
“substantially limits” a major life activity, but the precise meaning of these phrases is still far
from clear, even after a number of Supreme Court decisions. See, Sutton v. United Air Lines;
Murphy v. United Parcel Service; and Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.
6. The right to require reasonable accommodation by one's current employer is unique to the
ADA, and is likely to be especially valuable for disabled employees, whose current employer
may be their final employer in many cases.  “Most disabilities occur among older adults who
have little opportunity to change occupations or acquire new job skills. The late onset of
disability implies that an employer had an opportunity to observe the worker's productivity prior
to his becoming disabled and is better informed than other employers regarding his likely
productivity as a disabled worker. Thus the pre-injury employer may be the only potential
employer of a disabled worker. In many cases, the ability of a disabled worker to work is
determined by whether or not his pre-injury employer is willing to provide accommodations for
his functional limitations” (Burkhauser, 1990). In our earlier work, we found that before 1991,
only 10 percent of employment discrimination plaintiffs were suing their current employer. We
expect that this fraction rose after passage of the ADA, although we currently lack data on this
question.
7. “All claims filed pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must be processed
initially by the EEOC, as is also true for claims filed under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988); 29
U.S.C. § 626(d) (1994) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (Americans with Disabilities Act). The only exceptions are for claims filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which applies to race and national origin
discrimination, and under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988). . .  .  Most § 1981
claims filed in federal court include a Title VII allegation, which means that the underlying claim
was processed by the EEOC. As a result, approximately 85% of employment discrimination
cases are initially processed by the EEOC.” (Selmi (1996).)
8.  Somewhat more formally, suppose that under the pre-1991 rules, damages were a
function of the unemployment rate and other random factors, so that D0 = D(U,,0), where U is
the unemployment rate and ,0 is other factors uncorrelated with the business cycle. By the rules
for calculating backpay, dD0/dU > 0, so that higher unemployment rates lead to higher damages.
After the 1991 Civil Rights Act, D1 = D(U, ,1), where F21 > F20 is the variance of ,, the non-
backpay component of damages. Since the variance of , has increased due to the legislation,
post-1991 damages, D1, will depend less on changes in the unemployment rate than pre-1991
damages did: random variation in non-backpay damages will attenuate the measured effect of
unemployment on damages after 1991, even though the direct effect of an increase in U will not
have changed. 
9. To solve the problem of multicollinearity, we detrended the unemployment rate by
regressing it against a Time Trend and keeping the residuals from this regression. This
guarantees that there will be no correlation between the detrended unemployment rate and Time.
Having done this, however, the problem is that for the period after 1992, there is very little
variation left in the unemployment rate once the trend has been subtracted-out. The bottom half
of Figure 1 demonstrates this visually: post-1992 unemployment rates follow a downward trend
very closely. Alternatively, consider Table 5, which compares the standard deviation of
detrended Unemployment rates in the 2 sample periods: the second period standard deviation is
one-third the size of the first. 
The ‘insufficient variance’ problem was absent before 1992, since the economy
experienced several complete business cycles during the first 92 quarters of our data set. There
were thus periods of rising and falling unemployment, and there was plenty of variation “left” in
detrended unemployment rates before 1992 after the time-trend had been netted-out. 
While clearly undesirable from the perspective of national welfare, a significant recession
is needed to be able to differentiate between the effects of unemployment and the mere passage
of time after 1992.
10. The Priest/Klein model of the selection of disputes for litigation (Priest & Klein, 1984)
predicts that settlement rates will increase when (a) employer/defendants have higher stakes in
litigation than do employee/plaintiffs; and (b) the amount of damages increases. The first claim is
arguably true of employment discrimination cases, since plaintiff win rates are so low. The
second claim is true whenever a recession induces longer unemployment spells and greater
backpay damages (Siegelman & Donohue, 1995).
11.  The award size data are somewhat problematic, however. Our earlier research revealed
that the data are subject to frequent miscoding, especially for larger awards. (The problem seems
to be that clerks entered the award size directly, when it was supposed to be entered in thousands
of dollars. Thus, an award of $2,000 should be coded as 2, but if it is instead entered as $2000, it
will be read as $2,000,000 (Donohue & Siegelman, 1993 note 104). Since few plaintiffs will earn
more than $10 million (except perhaps for some of the largest class actions), it probably makes
sense to look only at those cases with awards of less than 9999 rather than including all awards,
as in the next row. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that there were no cases with
awards of 9999 in the post-1992 period, presumably because coding errors decreased over time.
12. Indeed, informal conversations with several California lawyers who represent defendants
in employment discrimination suits have strongly suggested that plaintiffs should always prefer
to file in state court rather than federal court.
13. In the wake of a celebrated incident involving Danny Glover, the problems of race-based
refusal of service by New York taxicabs attracted considerable attention in the press. The
comments of many who were interviewed comport with the notion that dignitary harms, rather
than financial losses, were especially on victims’ minds. Chen (1999), quotes black residents the
effect that “being bypassed hurt them to the core.”
